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Shifting Sands - A Comparison of
English and American Coastal Zone
Management Programs
By ROBERTA LEE JONES
Member of the Class of 1989
I. INTRODUCTION
Large portions of the United States and England border on water.
Each country contains coastal areas of high population density and some
relatively unspoiled stretches of coastline. At different points in history,
both countries recognized the need for comprehensive planning in the
coastal zone. With this recognition came the notion that the central gov-
ernment should bear some responsibility for the protection of certain
public rights and interests within the coastal zones. As a result, Eng-
land's and the United States plans for coastal zone management each
contain provisions for the control of certain aspects of both commercial
and private development.
Many commentators have noted that the goals of the state regula-
tory schemes may conflict with the interests of private property owners
in the coastal zone.1  "The question to be addressed is how may the
conflict be eliminated, and if it cannot be, what is the balance we will
choose?"' Both the conflict between public and private interests and the
potential costs to governments undertaking regulatory programs are im-
portant factors in the history and current status of coastal management
in the United States and England.
In the United States, the cost of compensating property owners
when land use regulations are declared invalid may begin to play an in-
1. See Note, Fear and Loathing on the California Coastline: Are Coastal Commission
Property Exactions Constitutional? 14 PEPPERDINE L. REv. 357, 359 (1987) (authored by M.
Disney); see Huffman, Individual Liberty and Environmental Regulation: Can We Protect Peo-
ple While Preserving the Environment?, in A PLANNER'S GUIDE TO LAND USE LAW 251, 257
(S. Meek & E. Netter eds. 1983) [hereinafter A PLANNER'S GUIDE]; see also Swanson, Sey-
mour & Ditton, An Alternative Perspective on Common Property Resource Allocation Decisions
in the Coastal Zone, 4 COASTAL. ZONE MGMT. L 25, 34-35 (1978).
2. Huffman, supra note 1, at 257.
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creasingly important role in coastal zone regulation. Recently the
United States Supreme Court enhanced the rights of private property
owners; the government is no longer free to regulate as extensively as it
once could without compensating property owners.3 Although the re-
cent Supreme Court decisions require state governments to exercise their
regulatory power more carefully, the impact of the decisions is not yet
known. It is clear, however, that the cost of regulation is becoming a
bigger issue in the minds of many planners, who worry about the chilling
effect these decisions may have on regulatory programs in general.4 In
light of this recent Supreme Court trend, the once successful coastal zone
management program in the United States faces an uncertain future.
In England, by contrast, cost considerations have exerted an influ-
ence on coastal zone management programs since their initiation. Unlike
the United States, England does not appear to face as many immediate
and alarming problems concerning the future management of its coast-
lines. It is also clear that England has pursued a less aggressive and less
innovative planning program in its coastal zone. As a result, the English
program has caused fewer conflicts with property owners than has the
United States program. This is partially due to the English government's
desire to avoid paying compensation for highly elaborate regulatory pro-
grams. It is possible, however, that England has avoided many of the
problems encountered by the United States at the expense of sound
coastal management.
Although the English coastal zone management program is less ef-
fective than the United States program, this situation may change if re-
cent Supreme Court decisions are indicative of future trends in United
States programs. Focusing on the issue of regulatory takings, this Note
explores the successes and failures of both the United States and Eng-
land's approach to coastal zone management. Specifically, this Note
traces the history and development of coastal management in the United
States and England, compares the two programs, and proposes possible
improvements for both programs.
3. Supreme Court Does It Again, J. AM. PLAN. A, Aug. 1987, at 28. The American
Planning Association suggests that the United States Supreme Court's two recent decisions,
First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. -, 107
S.Ct. 2378 (1987), and Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n., 482 U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 3141
(1987), "may well alter the planning environment, particularly in California, in favor of devel-
opers." Id. But see Sax, Property Rights in the Supreme Court, 3 WATERFRoNT AaE 6 (1987)
(arguing that these two cases need not lead to widespread change in planning programs).
4. See Sax, supra note 3.
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H1. THE UNITED STATES PROGRAM FOR COASTAL
ZONE MANAGEMENT
A. Background: The Development of Public Concern for Protecting
Natural Resources
In the United States, enforcement of the Coastal Zone Management
Act (CZMA)5 through its state counterparts has led to many disputes
between public and private landowners. In these disputes, landowners
usually claim that a particular regulation decreased property values by
limiting a landowner's ability to use or develop the land in a certain man-
ner. Some landowners have challenged the validity of such regulations,
arguing that they are unreasonable exercises of police power.' Other
owners have gone further and argued that a taking has occurred, trigger-
ing the right to just compensation under the fifth amendment.7
Constitutional law has played an important role in the delineation of
an owner's rights in the coastal zone. In the United States, the fifth
amendment to the Constitution expressly protects the rights of property
owners by prohibiting "takings" of property without the payment of just
compensation.8 This clause applies to the states as well.9 Courts have
generally agreed that, while the fifth amendment does not prohibit the
government from taking private property for public purposes, it does
"place a condition on the exercise of that power."10 For example, "in
the event of otherwise proper interference amounting to a taking," the
fifth amendment requires compensation. 1
Problems arise, however, when courts are asked to decide what de-
gree of interference with property rights constitutes a taking. In general,
the courts agree that a "physical invasion" of property by the govern-
ment presents an easy case for compensation: "[t]he one uncontestable
case for compensation (short of formal expropriation) seems to occur
when the government deliberately brings it about that its agents, or the
public at large, 'regularly use' or 'permanently occupy' space or a thing
5. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-64 (1985).
6. See Note, supra note 1, at 360-61; see also Construction Indus. Ass'n v. City of
Petaluma, 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1975).
7. See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
8. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
9. Chicago, B., & Q. R. R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 239 (1897).
10. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S-,
107 S.Ct 2378, 2385 (1987), (citing Williamson County & Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining
and Reclamation Assn., 452 U.S. 264, 297, n.40 (1981)).
11. First English, 482 U.S., 107 S.Ct at 2386.
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which theretofore was understood to be under private ownership."' 2
More difficult questions concerning compensation for takings arise in
cases in which the government regulates the use of property in a manner
that prevents the owner from putting the property to a certain use. 3
Because conflicts between private ownership rights and public rights
have created much of the controversy surrounding coastal management
regulations, a historical survey of the United States courts' view of pri-
vate ownership follows.
Nineteenth century Americans viewed land primarily as a transfera-
ble commodity, valuable for farming. 4 The courts recognized the
owner's traditional right to alienate land freely and looked upon compre-
hensive regulatory schemes such as zoning ordina:nces with suspicion.
15
Courts were also hesitant to allow the government to restrict the activi-
ties of landowners, and recognized only the traditional common law
power to enjoin nuisances such as slaughterhouses. 6
In the historic decision of Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co,'
7
the United States Supreme Court first acknowledged that, consistent
12. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of
"Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARv. L. REv. 1165, 1184-85 (1967).
13. In the United States, courts most often have analyzed regulatory taking problems
using the test set forth in Penn Central Transportatioq Co. v. City of New York. See Note,
supra note 1, at 370, (citing to Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S.
104 (1977)). The case identifies a number of standards which, if met, indicate that a regulation
falls outside the police power of a state and constitutes a taking which must be compensated,
The Penn Central court set up a balancing test which included inquiry into (1) the character of
the invasion, (2) the diminution in value of the property, (3) reciprocal benefits available to the
affected party (for example, the state may give the owner added development permission on
another property), and (4) the party's expectations. These factors are balanced against the
legitimate state interest underlying the regulation. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124-25, 129.
However, this balancing test leaves much discretion to the judges. Generally, if the court finds
that there is any economically viable use for the property after the regulation, it will find there
was no taking and no need for payment of just compensation. rd. at 125. See generally, 1,
DUKEMINIER & J. KRIER, PROPERTY 1168-70 (1981). Courts have generally applied the Penn
Central analysis to regulatory takings questions resulting from regulations of coastal land,
although the regulation in Penn Central was originally applied to a building situated in New
York City.
14. See Bosselman & Callies, The Quiet Revolution in Land-Use Control, in A PLANNER'S
GUIDE, supra note 1, 301-02.
15. See J. DUKEMINIER & J. KRIER, supra note 13, at 1224 n.5. Prior to the United
States Supreme Court's decision in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S, 365
(1926), many people believed comprehensive zoning ordinances violated the Constitution as a
taking or a deprivation of due process, unless the government provided compensation. To cure
the problem, some jurisdictions enacted zoning-with-compensation ordinances. Although
most of these ordinances have been repealed, a few survive. Id.
16. Williams, The Four Periods of Land Use Controls, in A PLANNER'S GUIDE, supra note
1, at 39-40.
17. 272 U.S. 365, 394-95 (1926); see also id. at 40.
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with the fifth amendment, states could restrict land use for aesthetic rea-
sons and other even less tangible state interests. As a result of Euclid,
courts have come to accept greater governmental intrusion into the rights
of property'owners, subject to the states' abilities to demonstrate the need
for the restrictions.18 Although the Euclid ruling applied only to com-
prehensive zoning regulations, courts have read Euclid broadly to vali-
date the use of aesthetic considerations in evaluating land use
regulation.
1 9
The Wisconsin case of Just v. Marinette County" demonstrates the
court's increasing willingness to authorize restrictions on property rights
for the protection of natural resources. In Just, the plaintiffs challenged
the constitutionality of a local ordinance banning the filling of wetlands
without a permit.2 ' The Wisconsin Supreme Court determined that no
taking had occurred and upheld the regulation by classifying it as a rea-
sonable exercise of the state's "police power."'  In reaching this result,
the court relied upon the classic work on police power by Professor
Freund. Professor Freund distinguishes between regulations placed on
property in order to create a public benefit and those that prevent a pub-
lic harm.3' According to him, a regulation that creates a public benefit
requires compensation while a regulation enacted to prevent a public
harm does not.' Therefore, by merely identifying fill as a public harm,
the Just court was able to reach a conclusion of constitutionality.
In applying Professor Freund's test, the Just court made the takings
analysis appear deceptively simple. In reality, however, it is often diffi-
cult to distinguish a regulation enacted for the public benefit from one
enacted to prevent a public harm; often a regulation serves both pur-
poses. Perhaps the court recognized the limitations of the police power
justification since it emphasized public policy. The court stated that wet-
lands should be viewed as a valuable resource and that regulations that
maintain the status quo by forbidding their destruction prevented a sig-
nificant public harm.' The court also relied on Wisconsin's status as a
18. See Note, supra note 1, at 361. Euclid validated the use of the police power to protect
the "general welfare" in the land use context. Despite this ruling, many courts did not accept
aesthetic concerns as a legitimate general welfare basis for the police power until many years
after Euclid was decided. Id at 361-62.
19. Id at 361.
20. 56 Wis. 2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1972).
21. 201 N.W.2d at 764-65.
22. Id at 771.
23. Id at 767.
24. Id
25. Id at 767-68.
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public trust state.26 The reference to the public trust doctrine is impor-
tant because it signifies the court's acceptance of the broad principle of a
government holding natural resources in trust for the people.27
Though it failed to unravel the takings problem, the Just court used
a commonly accepted justification for land use regulation: the legitimate
state interest. Simply stated, a land use regulation does not constitute a
taking requiring compensation if it substantially advances legitimate state
interests and does not deny the owner all economic benefits from his
land.28 This principle appears to be well accepted, even though courts
have not articulated a consistent rationale for their decisions in takings
cases.2 9 Clearly, the police power of a state allows authorities to impose
conditions on private development,3" but it is not clear how far these
conditions extend.
As Just illustrates, in the latter part of the twentieth century judicial
protection of Wisconsin wetlands provided the groundwork for the pro-
tection of other natural resources. United States courts have expanded
26. Id at 768. For more information on the public trust doctrine see Sax, The Public
Trust Doctrine in Natural Resources Law: Effective Judicial Introduction, 68 MIcH. L. Rv.
471 (1970). The public trust doctrine applies to lands that are, or once were, part of the public
domain. Public trust arguments are commonly used in attempts to limit government transfers
of land to private parties; or, as in Just v. Marinette, to justify regulation of the private use of
trust resources. Id at 486-87. The public trust doctrine was held to be part of the federal
common law in the United States in Illinois Central Railroad v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 452-53
(1892). It is often noted that tidelands are subject to the public trust doctrine, but the extent to
which a state subject to the public trust can alienate trust lands is a question of state law and
therefore differs from state to state. See Sax, supra, at 525-27. In a very recent case concerning
ownership of tidelands, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that a state that recognizes the public
trust retains title to tidewaters regardless of navigability of such waters. The court stated
further that any lands subject to the "ebb and flow" of the tides belong to the state, unless, of
course, the state previously conveyed title to such lands. Phillips Petroleum Co. & Conque
Bambini Partnership v. Mississippi & Saga Petroleum, -U.S.-, 108 S. Ct. 791, 799 (1988).
27. Just v. Marinette County, 56 Wis. 2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761, 768-69 (1972).
28. Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980); see also Penn Central Transportation v.
City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 127 (1978).
29. The heart of the problem may lie with the definition put forth in the watershed case on
regulatory takings and inverse condemnation, Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393
(1922), which states that a state may not go "too far" in regulating land-use without payment
ofjust compensation. Id. at 415. Obviously such a vague standard leads to confusion. Other
cases have upheld regulations if the state agency could "rationally have decided" that the
regulation might achieve the state's objectives. Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 44
U.S. 456, 466 (1981). Yet another theory for analyzing regulations focuses on the lack of a
landowner's civic duty to bear the burden of public improvements (i.e., if a property owner is
made to bear a burden that should rightly be shouldered by the general public, the owner must
be compensated for his loss). San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 656
(1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Arguably, all of the above are variations on the analysis of
legitimate state interests, as set forth in Penn Central. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 121-29.
30. See Agins, 447 U.S. at 261.
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the government's power to regulate private property for the public inter-
est, especially in the environmental area.3' The expansion of a state's
right to regulate in the public interest and the relationship of public and
private rights are fundamental concepts underlying the development of
the United States coastal zone management program.
B. The Federal Coastal Zone Management Act
The United States directly addressed the coastal zone management
problem with the comprehensive Coastal Zone Management Act
(CZMA), enacted in 1972.32 Although the Reagan Administration ini-
tially did not lend its full support to the CZMA, it has received contin-
ued support in Congress and was reauthorized on April 7, 1986.13 The
CZMA is founded on agreements between the coastal states and the fed-
eral government and offers financial assistance to states that develop their
own programs, referred to as Coastal Management Plans (CMPs), in
compliance with minimum CZMA standards.34 The CZMA combines
development and conservation goals in a statutory plan designed to ad-
dress the full array of problems inherent in managing coastal zones.35
Congress intended to encourage states to voluntarily develop and
implement coastal zone management programs meeting specified na-
tional standards.36 Once states promulgate their own CMPs, the federal
government delegates enforcement authority to states. The federal fund-
ing carries certain restrictions with it, however. The CZMA provides
strong incentives for states to conform to the federal standards by au-
thorizing the federal government to withhold or withdraw federal funds
if a state CMP fails to meet federal standards.3 7 As of 1986, twenty-nine
of thirty-five states eligible for funds under the CZMA had implemented
a CMP, although individual plans vary a great deal. 8
The CZMA was criticized on the grounds that it lacked an articu-
lated purpose. In 1980, Congress enacted a set of amendments which
31. See generally Williams, The Four Periods of Land Use Controls, in A PLANNE's
GUIDE, supra note 1, at 41-45.
32. See Archer & Knecht, The U.S National Coastal Zone Management Program -
Problems and Opportunities in the Next Phase, 15 CoASTAL MGTrr. 103, 103-04 (1987).
Coastal Zone Management Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-64 (1985).
33. See Archer & Knecht, supra note 32, at 103, 107-08 (referring to Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act, Pub. L. No. 99-272 (1985)).
34. Id at 104.
35. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1452(2)(A)-(H) (1985).
36. 16 U.S.C. § 1452(2) (1985).
37. Archer & Knecht, supra note 32, at 105 (referring to CZMA, 16 U.S.C. § 1458(d)
(1982)).
38. Id at 107.
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clarified its purpose by providing for a higher level of protection for spe-
cific coastal resources. The 1980 amendments require "protection of nat-
ural resources, including wetlands, flood plains, estuaries, beaches,
dunes, barrier islands, coral reefs, and fish and wildlife and their habitat,
within the coastal zone."
39
Although the 1980 amendments clarified the CZMA's purpose, the
CZMA still defines areas under its jurisdiction vaguely. The Act defines
coastal zones as "coastal waters ... and the adjacent shorelands...
strongly influenced by each other."'  This definition leaves much discre-
tion to the states to determine the jurisdiction of their own CMP's. Vari-
ous coastal states have interpreted the CZMA's vague jurisdictional
declarations differently and individual state programs vary a great deal in
scope. 1 In California, the coastal zone includes only a narrow strip of
land two to three miles inland from the coast.4 2 In North Carolina, by
contrast, the coastal zone includes all coastal counties.
43
The United States CZMA has had an impact on the management of
coastal areas, but it is difficult to measure the success of the CZMA in
protecting coastal resources because there are few studies on the effects of
the federal program at state and local levels." One study assembled data
on state consistency reviews of federal and federally permitted activities;
the study "strongly indicate[d] that both major and minor activities and
projects in the coastal zone have been modified, sometimes considerably,
to meet state CZM[A] standards. '4 5 Although it is difficult to study the
practical effects of the CZMA on coastal resources in the states, the fact
that most eligible states have implemented some type of coastal protec-
tion program indicates that the national program has helped preserve
coastal resources.46
39. CZM Improvement Act of 1980, Pub. L. 96-464, 94 stat. 2060, reprinted in 1980 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4348, 4389 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 1452(1)(A)
(1985)).
40. 16 U.S.C. § 1453(1) (1985).
41. See Archer & Knecht, supra note 32, at 107.
42. Billings v. California Coastal Comm'n., 103 Cal. App. 3d 729, 745, 163 Cal. Rptr. 288
(1980). The court also held that the Commission abused its discretion by finding that a land-
owner's minor subdivision, three miles from the coast, would have a "significant" future ad-
verse effect on the area by encouraging future development. The court found that the
Commission's speculation about future effects fell outside the terms of section 30250 of the
statute. Id at 741.
43. F. ANDERSON, D. MANDELKER & A. D. TARLOCK, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION:
LAW AND POLICY 846 (1984).





C. The California Coastal Zone Management Plan
Because the CZMA relies so heavily on state participation, it is help-
fil to examine a representative state program in order to fully under-
stand the practical effects of the CZMA. California's state program
began as the showpiece of the CZMA it has an interesting and contro-
versial history, and thus will serve as an excellent example of a represen-
tative state program under the CZMA.
The California plan was established by ballot initiative in 1972, prior
to the formal enactment of the CZMA.4 This initiative created the state
coastal zone management statute and the California Coastal Commission
(Commission), an agency to administer and enforce the statute. The bal-
lot initiative was amended to meet the formal requirements of the CZMA
when legislature enacted the California Coastal Act of 1976 (CCA).43 As
originally drafted, the state plan required the Commission to relinquish
planning authority to local governments once local governments formu-
lated acceptable management plans and received Commission approval
of the plans. The CCA originally contained a schedule that required the
Commission to delegate authority to local governments by the early
1980s.41 Yet due to budget cuts, political opposition from many fronts,
and bureaucratic footdragging on the Commission's part, the Commis-
sion was unable to delegate its authority to local governments according
to the timetables and provisions of the state plan.50 In response to these
delays, the legislature eliminated the deadlines requiring delegation of
authority from the CZMA.5 '
Commentators have criticized the Commission's failure to delegate
its authority to local governments in a timely manner.52 Many of the
Commission's enforcement policies also have been unpopular with land-
owners and commentators. During the 1970s, for example, the Commis-
sion regularly turned down development projects.53 This policy caused
many commentators and property owners to criticize the Commission
47. California Coastal Act of 1976, CAL. PB. RES. CODE §§ 30000-30900 (West 1986)
(originally added by Initiative Measure of Nov. 7, 1972, as CAL PuB. REs. CODE §§ 27000-
27650 (West 1972)); see also Weber, Evolution of an Agency, CAL. LAw., Feb., 1984 at 25.
48. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 30000-30900 (West 1986).
49. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 30500(a) & 30501 (West 1986 & Supp. 1987); see also
Weber, supra note 47, at 25.
50. See Weber, supra note 47, at 25.
51. Id.; see also CAL. PuB. Rys. CODE § 30501 (West 1986 & Supp. 1987) (amending
CAL. PuB. REs. CODE § 30501 (1981)).
52. See Weber, supra note 47, at 25.
53. Id
19891
Hastings Int'l and Comparative Law Review
for its proenvironmental stance.54 Because many of the Commission's
mandates were vague, they also became a source of contention between
the Commission and property owners." The Commission's position on
public access was one of its most controversial policies, and has produced
a sizeable body of case law in California.
D. The California Coastal Commission's Policy on Public Access
Historically, when a developer sought a permit, the Commission
conditioned the grant of this permit on the developer's dedication of
easements for public access.56 This practice, referred to as the Commis-
sion's property "exactions," has consistently raised issues of regulatory
takings 7.5  The Commission's opponents have challenged the property
exaction policy on the grounds that the Commission improperly inter-
preted the California Constitution,58 which states that the public has a
right of access to navigable waters.59 Nonetheless, the courts deferred to
the judgment of the Commission on most occasions. The California
courts determined that because "[tihere is a clearly enunciated state pub-
lic policy in favor of allowing public access to shoreline areas," a prop-
erty owner in the coastal zone may not reasonably expect to enjoy
exclusive use of such property.'
The Commission itself is not solely responsible for its property exac-
tion policy. The CCA contains a dedication provision to insure public
right of access.6" Section 30210 of the CCA, amended in 1978, provides
that the Commission must pursue a policy of ". . . maximum access,
which shall be conspicuously posted, and recreational opportunities shall
be provided for all the people consistent with the public safety needs and
the need to protect public rights, rights of private property owners and
natural resource areas from overuse."'62 Clearly this language vests the
Commission with wide discretion in formulating policies related to pub-
lic access. As the California Court of Appeal noted in Mhaler's Village v.
California Coastal Comm'n., "[o]ne of the objects of the 1976 version of
54. Id. See generally Note, supra note 1, at 357.
55. See Weber, supra note 47, at 26.
56. Id. at 25.
57. See Note, supra note 1, at 367-68.
58. Weber, supra note 47, at 25.
59. CAL. CONST. art. X, § 4.
60. Whaler's Village Club v. California Coastal Comm'n., 173 Cal. App. 3d 240, 254, 220
Cal. Rptr. (1985); see also Pacific Legal Found. v. California Coastal Comm'n., 33 Cal3d 158,
163, 188 Cal. Rptr. 104 (1982).




the coastal act was to preserve existing public rights of access to the
shoreline and to expand them for the future."'63 Other policies derive
from the Commission's own interpretations of the California Constitu-
tion, which states that the public has a right of access to "navigable
waters."
The CCA provides for public access both to and along the shore.64
The Commission has interpreted this provision to include vertical ease-
ments, which run inland from the coast and allow the public to cross
private property to gain access to the coastline, and also lateral ease-
ments, which run along the coastline and allow the public to travel along
the shoreline without encountering barriers placed by private owners. 65
The CCA empowers the Commission to subject the issuance of develop-
ment permits to "reasonable terms and conditions."6 6 This power serves
to support property exactions for public access.67 By conditioning the
grant of a coastal development permit on dedication of a public easement
by the property owner, the Commission has extended "traditional" prop-
erty exactions such as exactions for parks, streets and sewers to require
property dedications to a wider range of development situations includ-
ing beach access.68
E. California Case Law
Historically, California courts have required that a condition or ex-
action need not directly alleviate the problem caused by the proposed
development or change of use of the property.69 Thus, the law allowed
authorities to require property exactions from landowners that were indi-
rectly related to the type of additional burden on land use that the pro-
posed development was expected to create. Other states, such as Florida,
require that a permit condition bear some causal relationship to the pro-
posed development. 0 The requirement of a causal relationship is often
referred to as the "nexus requirement." States like Florida require a "di-
63. 173 Cal. App. 3d at 254.
64. CAL. Pun. REs. CODE § 30001.5(C) (West 1986).
65. See Note, supra note 1, at 357 n.1.
66. Id at 358; see also CAL. PuB. REs. CODE § 30609 (West 1986).
67. See Note, supra note 1, at 358-59.
68. See Comment, Public Beach Access Exactions: Extending the Public Trust Doctrine to
Vindicate Public Rights, 28 UCLA L. REv. 1049, 1050 (1981); see eg., Grupe v. California
Coastal Comm'n., 166 Cal. App. 3d 148 (1985); Miramar Co. v. City of Santa Barbara, 23 Cal.
2d 170, 143 P.2d 1 (1943).
69. Associated Home Builders, Inc. v. City of Walnut Creek, 4 Cal. 3d 633, 638-40, 484
P.2d 606, 94 Cal. Rptr. 630 (1971).
70. See Note, supra note 1, at 368.
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rect nexus" between the permit condition and proposed development be-
cause allowing an indirect nexus is unfair to property owners.71
California, however, has adhered to a more liberal rule that could be
characterized as an "indirect nexus" rule, as illustrated by Associated
Home Builders, Inc. v. City of Walnut Creek. 2
California's liberal nexus rule is based upon a broad reading of the
police power as defined in the analysis first presented in Associated Home
Builders.73 There, the court stated that the regulation's relationship to
the general health and welfare of the citizens determined whether the
police power of the state justified the exaction. 74 In Associated Home
Builders, the court determined that requiring a subdivider to dedicate a
public park promoted the "aesthetic good" of the state because Califor-
nia's increasing population would eventually require increased recrea-
tional facilities; thus, the regulation served a legitimate state interest.
75
As Associated Home Builders illustrates, the indirect nexus rule gave reg-
ulatory agencies great power to require dedications from landowners.76
In addition, when California courts found that a regulation
amounted to a taking under the fifth amendment, they limited property
owners to equitable remedies and did not allow actions for money dam-
ages. The California Supreme Court declared that landowners may not
sue the government for compensation for a loss resulting from an unfair
regulation because such an inverse condemnation action would, in effect,
force the government to exercise its eminent domain power.77  The
United States Supreme Court upheld California's prohibition on damage
awards for regulations that preclude all use of property in violation of the
fifth amendment in Agins v. City of Tiburon. 7 However, both Associated
Home Builders and Agins were effectively overturned in two recent deci-
sions by the United States Supreme Court.
71. Wald Corp. v. Metropolitan Dade County, 338 So. 2d 863, 866 (Fla. App. 1976).
72. 4 Cal. 3d 633, 638 (1971) (citing Ayers v. City Council of Los Angeles, 34 Cal. 2d 31
(1949)). See Note, supra note 1, at 367.
73. Id. at 633.
74. Id. at 641.
75. Id. at 639-40.
76. Id at 641. See generally Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 394-95
(1926).
77. Agins v. City of Tiburon 24 Cal. 3d 266, 275-77, 596 P.2d 25, 157 Cal. Rptr, 372
(1979). It appears that the court found that payment of compensation for inverse condemna-
tion actions would raise separation of powers issues. Id. at 275-76. Courts in the United States
customarily grant an injunction or invalidate a regulation in cases in which a taking has oc-
curred. See J: DUKEMINIER & J. KRIER, supra note 13, at 1169.
78. 24 Cal. 3d 266 (1979), affid on other grounds, 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
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E. The Regulatory Takings Issue and Coastal Zone Regulation
In Nollan v. California Coastal Commission,79 the United States
Supreme Court considered the problem of regulatory takings, and clari-
fied the limits of constitutionally permissible regulations by invalidating
the indirect nexus approach to property dedications. In Nollan, a single
family applied for a permit to enlarge their home on the same parcel of
land. The Commission concluded that the proposed development would
impair the view as well as the public's perception of the accessibility of
the area, creating a "psychological separation" from the beach. 80 Thus,
the Commission required the family to dedicate an easement for public
access in order to rebuild." The California Court of Appeals upheld this
property exaction as an exercise of police power,82 but the United States
Supreme Court reversed stating that there was insufficient causal rela-
tionship between the impact of the development and the condition im-
posed. 3 The Court's ruling indicated that the California standard for
property exactions, which requires no direct nexus between the condition
imposed and the impact of the proposed development, is unconstitu-
tional.8 4 The Nollan Court, by its own admission, viewed the fifth
amendment's taking clause as a significant barrier to any regulation fail-
ing to advance a "substantial" state interest.8"
The Nollan case indicates that although property exactions may be
permissible in subdivisions where large scale development creates an in-
creased burden on land use, these exactions may be inappropriate in the
case of a single family development.86 Regulation for the "aesthetic
good" may still be allowable in many instances, but the Court has set up
a more stringent standard than the one enunciated in Associated Home
Builders. The Nollan analysis requires proof that "provisions for public
access directly correspond to a particular type of burden on access cre-
79. 482 U.S., 107 S.Ct 3141 (1987).
80. Id at 3143.
81. Id
82. Id at 3144.
83. Id at 3148.
84. Id
85. I d at 3146.
86. Id at 3150. Subdivision map acts are state statutes that may require dedication of
lands or payment of fees for the purpose of preserving open land in subdivisions. California
subjects developers to such requirements. See Note, supra note 1, at 364. Some states have
recognized that subdivisions differ from single family home developments and reason that
property exactions are more easily justified in the case of large scale developers than in the case
of single family developers. Id Prior to the Nollan decision, California had not recognized this
distinction. Iad at 365-66; see also Nollan, 482 U.S. at--, 107 S.CL at 314647; see also Subdi-
vision Map Act, CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 66410-66499.52 (Deering 1987 and Supp. 1989).
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ated by new development.""7 Thus, if an agency such as the Commission
advances aesthetic concerns as justification for a regulation, it must show
that the development is eroding the aesthetic character of an area in
some substantial -way. Mere psychological separation from the beach, as
argued by the Commission in Nollan, will not suffice.
In Nollan, the Court reaffirmed the basic proposition that a state can
use its police power to regulate land use if the regulation advances a legit-
imate state interest.38 Echoing Justice Brennan's dissent, Professor Jo-
seph Sax, a noted environmental law authority, has argued that Nollan
has not significantly altered the substantive law regarding constitution-
ally allowable property restrictions.89 In fact, Brennan himself argued
that an agency like the Commission should not have difficulty formulat-
ing regulations in a way that avoids a takings problem because it can
rephrase the rationale behind the regulation to demonstrate the required
nexus.
90
Although Justice Brennan suggested in his dissent that the Nollan
rule may be easy for regulatory agencies to circumvent, the majority of
the Court cautioned that demonstrating the specific connections between
provisions for access and burdens on access would require more than
clever presentation by the agency.9' The Court stated that "[w]e view
the Fifth Amendment's property clause to be more than a pleading re-
quirement, and compliance with it to be more than an exercise in clever-
ness and imagination."9 Indeed, many land use planners fear the
decision will significantly restrict their regulatory activities." Although
planning authorities may be forced to curtail regulatory schemes, future
interpretations by the lower courts will determine the true impact of Nol-
lan on land-use planning.
In First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Ange-
les, the United States Supreme Court took another step toward making
state governments liable for excessive regulatory activities by invalidating
California's limit on damage awards for regulatory takings.94 Unlike
Nollan, which arguably redefines an existing rule, First English estab-
lishes a new rule of law concerning the appropriate remedy once land use
87. Nollan, 482 U.S. at -- 107 S.Ct at 3148; see also Sax, supra note 3, at 8.
88. Nollan, 482 U.S. at -, 107 S.Ct at 3150.
89. See Sax, supra note 3, at 8.
90. Id. at 8, (citing Nollan, 482 U.S. at -, 107 S.Ct. at 3161 (Brennan, J., dissenting)).
91. Nollan, 482 U.S. at -, 107 S.Ct. at 3150.
92. Guskind, Supreme Court Takes on the Takings Issue -. Again, J. AM. PLAN. A, July
1987, at 32.
93. See id.
94. 482 U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 2378 (1987).
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regulations are declared invalid.95 The Court held that if a regulation is
invalidated as excessive or an abuse of police power and deprives the
landowner of all use of his property, the government must compensate
the owner for the loss of land value during the time the regulation was in
force. Compensation is required regardless of "subsequent action" such
as the amendment or repeal of the regulation.96 The Court noted that
when a regulation deprives a landowner of all uses of his property, it
makes no difference whether the restriction is permanent or temporary;
just compensation is required.97 It is important to note, however, that
the First English Court remanded the case to the lower court to deter-
mine whether the regulation in question had in fact deprived the owner
of all uses of his property.9" Thus, the First English case does not offer
any new guidelines for determining when a regulation exceeds the limits
of the Constitution, but merely speaks to the issue of the appropriate
remedy for invalid regulations.
Compensation for "temporary" takings may be substantial, since a
regulation may be in force for several years while a lawsuit determining
its validity is pending. It is also possible, however, that compensation
may not be required in every case in which a regulation is invalidated
because in some instances, such as cases involving restrictions on single
family home owners, it may be difficult to prove that the regulation re-
sulted in financial loss. In First English, the Court noted that damages
must be measured using the same principles used to calculate damages in
normal condemnation actions.99 The Court also noted that the govern-
ment reserves the right to "acquiesce in a judicial declaration that one of
its ordinances has affected an unconstitutional taking of property."
Thus, when a regulation is invalidated, First English does not require the
government to exercise its eminent domain power, a possible outcome
that troubled the court in Agins. The decision does, however, require
monetary compensation for the damage produced by the regulation dur-
ing the time it was in effect even if the regulatory body chooses to repeal
or amend the offending regulation.101 Thus, depending on the govern-
ment's course of action and the facts of the case, the impact of First Eng-
lish will vary from case to case.
95. Sax, supra note 3, at 8.
96. First English, 482 U.S. at -, 107 S.Ct at 2388-89.
97. Id at 2388.
98. Id at 2389.
99. Ia at 2387.
100. Ia
101. Id The Court stated that "the landowner has no right under the Just Compensation
Clause to insist that a 'temporary' taking be deemed a permanent taking." Id
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F. Strategies: Eminent Domain v. Regulatory Management
of the Coast
Surprisingly, the First English Court did not suggest that govern-
ments utilize their eminent domain power in order to avoid liability for a
temporary taking. Yet, it is possible that the decision may lead to more
frequent use of the eminent domain power and ultimately result in
greater costs to governments. When the state suspects a regulation will
be deemed a taking by a court, the state would be wise, in light of the
First English decision, to institute eminent domain proceedings at the
outset in order to avoid a constitutional challenge to the regulation. If
the state chooses not to use its eminent domain power, the state may face
the expense of a lawsuit and be required to pay damages for a "tempo-
rary taking" when its regulation is later invalidated. Thus, the First Eng-
lish rule may have profound implications for our land use planning
system. Under the more generous standards for compensation set forth
in First English, it is likely that regulatory agencies will strive to make
their regulations constitutionally acceptable exercises of police power in
order to avoid the cost of compensating landowners.
Nollan, viewed as a companion to First English, sets forth a more
restrictive standard for constitutionally acceptable regulations. Under
Nollan, regulatory agencies like the Commission will no longer be able to
require property exactions for public access in some cases, thus forcing
such agencies to drop dedication provisions from their permits, or to
purchase easements for public access in order to meet their statutory
goals. The combination of Nollan and First English may compel regula-
tory agencies like the Coastal Commission to compromise their regula-
tory programs in order to avoid financial liability. It does not appear
that California's coastal regulatory system was constructed to absorb the
potential costs of these recent cases.
Although the United States CZMA was set up to provide funding to
states for coastal programs, this funding was not meant to cover the costs
of compensating landowners for losses in property values resulting from
excessive regulation. Section 1454(b)(7) of the CZMA directs that grants
be given to coastal states "for the protection of, and access to, public
beaches and other public coastal areas,"10 2 but the CZMA does not pro-
vide for the award of compensation to landowners for property exactions
resulting from regulations. In fact, the CCA contains a clear prohibition
on the use of eminent domain power to acquire land for coastal access.103
102. 16 U.S.C. § 1454(b)(7) (1985).
103. CAL. PUB. Rrs. CODE § 30010 (West 1986).
[Vol. 12
Coastal Zone Management
G. State Coastal Conservancy
The California Coastal Commission does not possess eminent do-
main power and therefore would be unable to purchase easements from
landowners to fulfill its public access policies. However, the State Coastal
Conservancy, a California coastal management agency, does possess the
authority to undertake such a program. The State Coastal Conservancy
administers programs under the CCA to help public agencies and munic-
ipalities acquire land for coastal access projects, but most of its projects
involve voluntary transfers of land."° However, the Coastal Conser-
vancy has the authority to request that the State Public Works Board
exercise eminent domain power on its behalf to acquire real property or
easements.'05
It appears, however, that the Coastal Conservancy's statute requires
that areas proposed for restoration must be identified in a certified local
coastal plan."0 6 It is difficult, given this language, to argue that the stat-
ute would allow the Coastal Conservancy to condemn land subject to
constitutionally suspect regulations under the guise of a proposed resto-
ration project. Although the statute does leave room for this possibility,
the legislature should amend the statute to include explicit authorization
for the purchase of easements for public access. Without such a legisla-
tive response, the Nollan decision's immediate effects remain uncertain.
IV. PUBLIC RIGHTS: THE ENGLISH COASTAL ZONE
MANAGEMENT PROGRAM
The development of coastal zone management in England has fol-
lowed a different path than that followed by the United States under the
CZMA. The English coastal protection program has not led to the same
types of conflicts that have resulted from the United States CZMA. The
conflicts that occur under the English program differ in kind and degree
from conflicts common under the United States scheme, such as disputes
over public access and filling marshlands. In England, commentators
complain of the lack of a strong, centralized coastal zone management
plan, 10 7 while in the United States, by contrast, landowners complain of
overzealous enforcement efforts by coastal management agencies. The
English government has recommended certain programs for coastal zone
104. State Coastal Conservancy, CAL PUB. REs. CODE §§ 31400 - 31405.5 (West 1986).
105. Id at § 31105.
106. Id at § 31201.
107. See generally Cullen, The Heritage Coast Program in England and Wales, 12
COASTAL ZoNE MGMT. J. 225, 252-53 (1984).
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management, but it has instituted few mandatory programs. Local plan-
ning authorities in England retain a great deal of autonomy in dealing
with coastal areas in their jurisdictions.
A. A Historical View of Coastal Planning in Entland
England- first recognized the problems of unplanned coastal develop-
ment in the mid 1930's. Early studies identified many of the coastal
management problems at issue at that time, including refuse dumping,
unfettered development, car parking, shack development, and public ac-
cess.108 Beginning in the 1950's and continuing into the 1960's, a series
of community and environmental groups requested that Parliament in-
vestigate the problem of planning in the coastal zone. 09 Although Par-
liament studied the problem, it never instituted a uniform plan for the
management and development of the coastline. 110 Instead, Parliament
left responsibility for protecting coastal areas in the hands of local au-
thorities, private landowners, and the Countryside Commission, a central
government agency charged with overseeing planning. 11
B. Many Programs Collectively Protect the Coast
1. The Heritage Coast Program
The English government first responded to the environmental con-
cerns of community and environmental groups in 1963 by issuing Circu-
lar 56/63, which requested local authorities to make inquiries into their
own coastal development problems and report back to the govern-
ment."1 2 Circular 56/63 directed local authorities to investigate four ba-
sic areas. First, authorities were to ascertain the portions of coastline
that required safeguarding. The circular then directed local authorities
to decide where development should be concentrated, take steps to re-
store lost amenities where possible, and finally, take account of the poten-
tial impact of development on scientific areas.
1 13
The Countryside Commission issued reports to the government
based on the results of Circular 56/63. The reports suggested protection
for four types of scenic coast, each requiring different management pro-
108. Id. at 226-27.
109. Id. at 229-30.
110. Id. at 232-35.
111. Id at 234.
112. See id. at 230, (construing Minister of Housing and Local Government Circular 56/
63. Coastal Preservation and Development. HMSO. (1963)).
113. See id. at 230.
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grams.' 4 These reports provided the framework for the Heritage Coast
Program."15 The government responded to the reports with Circular 12/
72, which "warmly endors[ed]" the Heritage Coast Program, but did not
grant such coasts any special statutory designation. 116 Thus, the Heri-
tage Coast program provides suggestions to local planning authorities
regarding coastal preservation, but does not impose any mandatory re-
strictions on local planning authorities. 17 Under this program local au-
thorities are responsible for defining Heritage Coasts.118
The government's refusal to institute a mandatory Heritage Coast
Program can be attributed to its confidence in the ability of local authori-
ties, private landowners, and the Countryside Commission to manage
coastal areas satisfactorily. 9 The Heritage Coast Program primarily
applies to relatively undeveloped stretches of coastline.12° Much of the
Heritage Coast is retained by private owners.121 The program provides
limited funding for parks and projects set up by local authorities to fur-
ther the public's enjoyment of the Heritage Coasts, but does not provide
extensive funding,1 22 as does the United States CZMA. As a result, local
governments have been slow to respond to the program.123
Despite its shortcomings, the Heritage Coast Program has been suc-
cessful in protecting stretches of relatively undeveloped coastline. As of
1981, 733 miles of coastline had received Heritage Coast designation.
Yet, in light of the far reaching concerns about development and coastal
management which inspired the program, it cannot be viewed as a com-
plete success. The program does not address the complex problem of
managing coastal areas with the degree of direction necessary to achieve
114. Id at 231-32.
115. Id
116. See id at 232-33, (construing Dept. of Environment Circular 12/72. The Planning of
the Undeveloped Coast. HMSO. (1972)).
117. Id
118. Id
119. See id at 234.
120. Id at 234.
121. Id at 234.
122. Id at 233.
123. Id The development of the Heritage Coast Program beyond the pilot phase has been
disappointing. This may be due to confusion about the status of the protected area, lack of
understanding on the part of national land use planning authorities, and difficulty securing
cooperation from local governments and interest groups. Id at 254. Other writers who have
followed the progress of the Heritage Coast Program, though aware of the programs short-
comings, have been more complimentary regarding its success. See Craig-Smith, The North
Yorkshire Heritage Coast Program: A Progress Report, 10 COASTAL ZONE MOMT. 3. 279
(1982).
124. Cullen, supra note 107, at 248-49.
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the broad aims of the Countryside Commission's 1970 reports. 125 The
program also does not impose any regulations or restrictions on more
developed areas of the English coastline.
1 26
2. The National Trust
The establishment of the National Trust also helped implement the
Heritage Coast Program. The National Trust is a private trust made up
of concerned citizens and environmental groups who have pooled their
resources and purchased large stretches of the English coastline. 127 In
1907 Parliament granted the Trust the right to declare land inalienable,
and as of 1976, the Trust owned 333 miles of coastline. 128 Many smaller
local trusts have followed the example of the National Trust. 129 Because
the land is held for the benefit of the nation, the Trust has faced the
problem of providing free access to the public without spoiling the pro-
tected areas. 130 In an effort to protect pristine areas from destruction by
the public, the National Trust has in many cases joined with local au-
thorities and the Countryside Commission to develop a management
scheme designed to protect scenic landscapes and restore damaged
habitats. 131
3. Sites of Significant Scientific Interest
Sites of Significant Scientific Interest (SSSI) is a recent national pro-
gram that reflects the conservation movement's current emphasis on
habitat preservation as opposed to species protection. 132 The 1981 Wild-
life and Countryside Act, which includes the SSSI program, is based on a
philosophy of voluntary cooperation.1 33 The Act relies on consultation,
negotiation, and management agreements, rather than compulsory pow-
ers, to deal with disputes.1 34 The SSSI's remain under the control of the
owner/occupier with the Nature Conservancy Council acting as advisor.
The SSSI program, like the Heritage Coast Program, does not im-
125. Id. at 250. The Countryside Commission's two reports suggested four different,
highly structured management programs for the coastline.
126. See id. at 235.
127. Id at 230-31. See generally Steers, Saving the Coast: The British Experience, 4
COASTAL ZONE MGMT. J. 7, 17 (1978).
128. Steers, supra note 127.
129. See id. at 18.
130. Id. at 17-18.
131. See Houston & Jones, The Sefton Coast Management Scheme: Project and Process, 15
COASTAL MGmT. 267, 280-81 (1987).
132. See Ball, Sites of Special Scientific Interest, 1987 J. PLAN. & ENVTL. L. 767.
133. id
134. See generally id.
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pose mandatory conditions on local governments. Although the SSSI
program requires development controls, commentators believe that the
courts will not hold these procedures mandatory. 135 Because planning
authorities are not under a mandatory duty to establish SSSI's, third par-
ties such as environmental groups have no basis upon which to challenge
planning decisions involving SSSIs.136
There are additional problems with the SSSI program. Because the
SSSI program calls for the regulation of large tracts of land, the interests
of the SSSI program clash with those of developers. 137 Modem agricul-
ture, the activity most likely to damage an SSSI, also often conflicts with
the SSSI program; yet, agriculture is exempt from development control
provisions."' Additionally, the voluntary SSSI system is slow and in-
volves costly management agreements. 13 9
C. International Treaties
As a member state of the European Community Treaty (ECT), Eng-
land must adapt its legislation to comply with the ECT's Directive 85/
337 effective July 3, 1988.1" The Directive, similar to the United States
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), requires the publication of
environmental impact statements and a public notice and comment pro-
cedure before planning authorities can grant or withhold permits for cer-
tain types of development projects. 4 ' The Directive applies only to
major projects proposed or permitted by government agencies. 142 Thus,
the impact of the Directive may be limited.
135. Id at 769.
136. I d
137. Id at 770.
138. Id at 769.
139. See id at 775. Section 29 of the Act allows for the designation of "super-SSI's" by
the Secretary of State. This provision allows a property owner six weeks to challenge the
decision in the High Court on grounds that it is outside the power of Section 29 or procedur-
ally incorrect. The provision has seldom been used; however, presumably because compensa-
tion to landowners is required. Section 29 also states that a court may require a landowner to
restore his land, but this too requires compensation. Id at 773-74.
140. Haigh, EnvironmentalAssessment- the ECDirective, 1987 . PLAN. & ENvrL_ L 4.
141. Id at 5.
142. Id, (citing National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, § 102, 42 U.S.C. § 4332
(1982)).
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VII. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COASTAL
MANAGEMENT PROGRAM IN ENGLAND
A. Implementation of Statutes
Parliament declined to establish a national program for coastal plan-
ning, despite recommendations from the National Trust and other pri-
vate organizations. 143 By 1968, however, the government responded to
pressures from increasingly powerful private interest groups by creating
the Countryside Act of 1968, which established the Countryside Com-
mission. 144 The Countryside Commission was charged with improving
and developing facilities and recreational access in the countryside, but
was not given formal statutory power to enforce its mandates. 145 There-
fore, the Countryside Commission had to achieve 'its goals by working
with private parties, local planning authorities, public agencies and vol-
untary bodies like the National Trust.146 Because coastal management in
England is closely tied to the general planning system, it is important to
review the operation of the planning system.
The current planning system, established by the Town & Country
Planning Act of 1968, set up a "structure and local plans" system to
manage planning in all areas, including coastal areas.147 This system in-
volves a general structure which is handed down from Parliament in the
form of statutes and circulars. Local governments then draft local plans,
which provide more specific directives for implementing structure
plans. 48 Once defined, Heritage Coasts are shown on statutory structure
and local plans and hence gain some formal protection. 4 9 Although
both central and local government authorities agree that there is a need
to supplement the structure and local plans system with additional infor-
mal local planning policies, the central government has discouraged such
action to date.1 50 The courts have also held that local governments
should bear primary responsibility for planning decisions. For example,
the House of Lords has held that the "structure and local plans" system
provides sufficient guidance to local governments to enable them to man-




147. See Bruton & Nicholsen, Supplementary Planning Guidance and Local Plans,, 1985 J.
PLAN. & ENVTL. L. 837, 837-38. Healy, The Role of Development Plans in the British Plan.
ning System: An Empirical Assessment, 8 URB. L. & POLICY 1, 4-5 (1986).
148. See Bruton & Nicholsen, supra note 147, at 838; see also 1). HAGMAN, URBAN PLAN-
NING AND LAND DEVELOPMENT CONTROL LAW: CHAPTERS 20 & 21 608-09 (1975).
149. Id at 233.
150. See Bruton & Nicholsen, supra note 147, at 837-38.
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age all land use problems in all parts of the country.15'
A two-tiered system of local government consisting of county coun-
cils and district councils implements local plans.1 52 The county council
is the more powerful body.153 The county council is mainly responsible
for planning, but often delegates planning responsibility to the district
council while maintaining responsibility for the structure plans." '
Local governments may also enact laws called bylaws, although
such laws cannot control zoning.155 England does not use zoning to the
extent that it is used in the United States.1 56 In contrast to general zon-
ing schemes, local authorities in England implement their local plans by
requiring developers to apply for "planning permission," an authoriza-
tion for a particular development project 15 7
B. Claims for Compensation
In general, local governments have implemented coastal zone man-
agement policies by granting or denying planning permission under the
general planning scheme. 58 When implementing planning policies, local
governments are subject to statutory requirements concerning compensa-
tion for denial of development permits.15 9 English courts have held,
however, that planning statutes are not confiscatory in nature, and there-
fore do not require the government to compensate landowners for losses
in property value that result from the operation of development plans.160
Two fairly recent English cases have held that when a planning authority
imposes a restriction in good faith, the court may set aside the decision,
but the owner is not entitled to money damages even if he or she has
suffered heavy financial losses.16 1 This rule is similar to the United States
rule prior to the decision in First English, and allows the government to
151. Id, at 837.
152. C. HARLOW & R. RAWLINGS, LAW AND ADMINISTRATION 431 (1984).
153. See D. HAGMAN, supra note 148, at 600.
154. Ad The structure plans consist of a written statement of planning policy and must
include recommendations from district councils and developers. The Minister must ulti-
mately approve structure plans. See generally idL at 426.
155. Id at 428.
156. See D. HAGMAN, supra note 148, at 613.
157. Id. Planning permission is required if the project qualifies as new development under
the statutory definition. Id at 613-15.
158. See Cullen, supra note 107, at 251.
159. See generally D. HAGMAN, supra note 148, at 619-20.
160. See Belfast Corp. v. O.D. Cars, Ltd. [1960] 1 All E.R. 65 (ILL).
161. Takaro Properties, [1978] 2 N.Z.L.R. 314 (P.C.); Dunlop v. Woolahra Municipal
Council, P.C., THE Tims, (London) Feb. 26, 1981 (LEXIS, Enggen library, Alleng file).
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restrict property owner's rights without risking financial liability for re-
strictions found to exceed the scope of the government's authority.
Some statutes governing planning authorities in England actually
contain specific compensation provisions that require the government to
compensate property owners for lost property value when the govern-
ment enforces certain planning provisions. In some situations the stat-
utes call for compensation when the government is not actually using its
eminent domain power, as when the government merely restricts devel-
opment pursuant to a planning statute. Thus, in situations spelled out in
the statutes, some English statutes require the government to pay land-
owners for regulatory takings. 62
C. Compensation for Losses Due to Regulations: Takings in England
Compensation awards for losses resulting from regulating land use
have an interesting history in England. By 1909, planning statutes began
to include "injurious affection" sections, which gave property owners a
right to compensation for any damages suffered from a regulation, sub-
ject to counter-claims by the state for any betterment. 163 Modern Eng-
lish statutes provide only limited compensation for "injurious affection"
of lands. 61 In a 1960 case dealing with compensation, the House of
Lords stated there was no mention of "taking" or "taking without com-
pensation" in past cases, and that the "taking" concept had not been
applied until the beginning of the twentieth century. 165 Generally, com-
pensation is determined by statute, and the availability of compensation
for the refusal of planning permission has varied throughout this
century. 
66
In In re Watch House16 7 a local planning authority brought an en-
forcement order under Section 28 of the Town & Country Planning Act
of 1962. The order required demolition of a privately owned, abandoned
coast guard lookout station. Although this case arose before England
162. See D. HAGMAN, supra note 148, at 619-21.
163. IL See also JUSTICE ALL-SOULS, REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN THE
UNITED KINGDOM, 70 (1981). The U.S. system presents a striking contrast. In the U.S., a
state may impose regulations on property owners without paying nmy compensation as long as
the regulation constitutes a valid exercise of the state's police power, If, however, the court
finds the regulation is so restrictive that it constitutes a violation of the fifth amendment, the
court will generally invalidate the regulation. See J. DUKEMINIER & J. KRIER, supra note 13,
at 1169. Once a taking is found, a landowner should theoretically be entitled to money dam-
ages or an injunction, but courts almost never require the state to pay money damages.
164. See B. POOLEY, THE EVOLUTION OF BRITISH PLANNINt, LEGISLATION 17 (1960).
165. Belfast Corp'n. [1960] 1 All E.R. at 72.
166. See D. HAGMAN, supra note 148, at 619.
167. 66 Knight's Local Gov't R. 6 (Q.B. 1967).
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had formally adopted the Heritage Coast program, the language in the
case evidences the planning authority's concern for coastal preservation.
The County Council considered this region to be one of the wildest and
most beautiful areas of the coast, an area of "exceptional natural
beauty." '168 The Town & Country Planning Act provided, in pertinent
part:
(1) If it appears to the local planning authority..., (a) that any use of
land should be discontinued, or that any condition should be imposed
on the continuance of the land .... (b)... he may require the discon-
tinuance of that use... [but] (4) [a]n order under this section shall not
take effect unless it is confirmed by the Minister...169
The County Council planned to compensate the landowner for any loss
in value to the property resulting from the demolition of the building.
The owner of the lighthouse brought suit to quash the demolition
order, claiming he intended to renovate the building. After acknowledg-
ing that the statute could be interpreted in various ways and that some
interpretations did not require demolition, the judge nevertheless ruled in
favor of the County Council. Thejudge noted that "[ilt seems to me that
all these are matters essentially for the planning authority and the Minis-
ter. It is,... well-established that the court must not substitute its own
view for the view of those to whom the exercise of the statutory power
has been entrusted."' 70
This case demonstrates the great power held by the local authorities
and the court's tendency to defer substantially to local findings. It is
interesting to note that the land owner did not disagree with the amount
of the compensation award, but merely wished to retain the building. In
re Watch House indicates that the courts approve of local planning au-
thorities' extensive power to control the activities of landowners in the
coastal zone. Yet, local governments have not used this power
extensively.
It is puzzling, in light of the compulsory purchase powers previously
discussed, that planning authorities have ordered the compulsory acqui-
sition of an easement for public access only once. It was not until 1984
that the Secretary of State for the Environment, pursuant to a recom-
mendation from an inspector, for the first time confirmed a compulsory
public path creation order. 7 ' In the United States, property exactions
168. Ide
169. Id citing to Town & Country Planning Act 1962, §§ 28, 36 HALSHURY'S STATUTES.
3d (1968).
170. Id
171. Samuels, Public Path Creation Order, 1985 . PLAN. & ENvrL. L 90. Public Path
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for public access are one of the primary ways in which the government
implements coastal zone management policies. It appears, however, that
public access has not assumed the priority role in England's coastal man-
agement policies that it has in the United States.
D. Costs in England
Controlling development has been a major problem in England's ef-
fort to protect its coastal resources. 172 The central government generally
has limited its involvement in coastal planning to suggestions to local
authorities rather than mandatory programs.17 3 The central govern-
ment's reliance on private organizations and local planning authorities to
protect coastal resources reflects, at least in part, its unwillingness to bear
the financial burden of a strong national coastal zone management pro-
gram. This fear may be well placed because it appears that English com-
pensation statutes would require compensation for many property
exactions necessary for a strong coastal zone management program.
English courts tend to undervalue environmental concerns when
they conflict with other social issues, such as energy production. The
public's interest in conservation of the coastline has suffered under this
system because in some coastal areas local planning authorities have cho-
sen to authorize development rather than pay compensation for develop-
ment restrictions. For example, the Council on the Protection of Rural
England stated that England's present planning policy is prodevelopment
and, not surprisingly, many restrictions on development have been
lifted. 174 In BP Petroleum Developments, Ltd. v. Ryders, BP sought cer-
tain environmentally important coastal land for petroleum production
under the national scheme. 175 The court assessed compensation value for
the land and permitted the drilling to proceed despite the land's designa-
tion as Heritage Coast and the opposition of numerous interested
parties.
176
Creation Order 1984 required that a public path be built across private land. Owners were
compensated pursuant to an assessment by the Lands Tribunal. The article states that "the
coastal path is of national significance, it is very nearly complete and continuous around the
south west, and the countryside and coast in question is outstanding for the scenic grandeur,
an area of outstanding natural beauty, and part of the Heritage Coast." Id. at 91.
172. See Cullen, supra note 107, at 251-52.
173. Id at 234.
174. C. HARLow & R. RAWLINGS, supra note 152, at 434.




VII. COMPARISON OF THE ENGLISH AND UNITED
STATES PROGRAMS
A. Analysis
In England, a variety of governmental departments work in con-
junction with local planning authorities and private organizations to de-
velop coastal zone management policies for various coastal areas. The
central government plays a minor role in developing coastal management
programs, delegating most of the responsibility for protecting coastal re-
sources to local planning authorities.177 Because England's coastal zone
management program emphasizes voluntary cooperation between private
landowners and local government, it appears that the program has
caused few disputes between landowners and the government.
Yet, England's system has resulted in inconsistent coastal protection
policies throughout the country.17 Pristine areas of the coast have re-
ceived a high level of protection through the efforts of private organiza-
tions and the government, but more developed areas have not received as
much protection.' 79 For example, while the scenic portions of the coast-
line held by the National Trust are well managed,180 in more developed
areas, private and public organizations have been less successful in pro-
tecting the remaining scenic lands. This situation appears to be chang-
ing, however, as local governments in industrialized areas begin to
recognize the value of their coastal resources to the largely urban popula-
tions of these areas." 1
In contrast, the United States has a strong federal program for
coastal zone management. Although the United States CZMA, like the
English program, is voluntary in nature, the CZMA has been adopted by
most coastal states in the United States. 82 Unlike the English program,
the United States CZMA substantially funds state agencies that manage
coastal areas.18 3 Many commentators feel the United States CZMA has
contributed a great deal to the protection of coastal resources in many
states.184 State programs enacted under the CZMA have, however, cre-
177. See Cullen, supra note 107, at 232-33.
178. See Houston & Jones, supra note 131, at 179.
179. See id at 295.
180. See Steers, supra note 127, at 17-18.
181. See Houston & Jones, supra note 131, at 267. The Sefton Coast lies entirely within an
urban area, yet it has recently become the focus of a new coastal management program in-
spired by the Heritage Coast concept IdL
182. See Archer & Knecht, supra note 32, at 107.
183. Id at 104.
184. See generally id at 103-04.
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ated conflicts between private property owners and coastal zone manage-
ment agencies such as the California Coastal Commission. Specifically,
coastal management policies have led to disputes in which property own-
ers allege that restrictions on private property use result in the taking of
property and thus require just compensation.
Concerns about costs may explain many of the differences in the
current United States and English programs for coastal management. In
England, economic concerns are expressed on a national level by Parlia-
ment in various ways. The establishment of numerous conservation pro-
grams based on the cooperation of landowners is one example. The fact
that the state invokes statutory compensation provisions sparingly is an-
other. The pervasive influence of private organizations like the National
Trust also supports the conclusion that the government has approached
coastal management from the perspective of cost efficiency. It appears
that under this system, the preservation of England's scenic coastal areas
and the development of recreational access for the public been less suc-
cessful than initially planned, although some pristine coastal areas have
been preserved.18 5
The flexibility that attends the voluntary system has also been one of
its greatest shortcomings. The flexibility of the English system allows
authorities to protect unique coastal areas, but also allows authorities to
make decisions that harm protected areas, as illustrated by BP Petro-
leum. A stronger regulatory program in England would help to ensure
that once coastal preservation programs are adopted, they are not eroded
later by adverse planning decisions.
In the United States cost considerations historically have not been a
key factor in the formation of coastal zone management policy. The
United States courts have rarely required coastal management agencies
to compensate landowners for losses in property value resulting from re-
strictions and property exactions. 186 This approach appears to be chang-
ing, though, as the United States Supreme Court has recently begun to
limit the broad regulatory authority of coastal management agencies in
its Nollan and First English decisions.
From now on the California Coastal Commi;sion and its counter-
parts will be forced to consider more carefully the costs of their coastal
zone management programs. The Nollan and First English decisions
may signal an end to the once successful coastal zone management pro-
gram in the United States; private property owners have been given an
185. See generally Cullen, supra note 107, at 250.
186. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
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edge in the battle with government agencies over coastal management
policies. Perhaps the real problem lies in the characterization of coastal
zone management as an inherently conflict ridden process.
The Nollan and First English decisions are unfortunate because they
perpetuate a view of coastal management policies as a source of conflict
between the public and private sector when, in fact, both sectors often
benefit from similar regulatory programs. Both landowners and regula-
tory agencies benefit from environmentally sensitive coastal management
programs because property values ultimately reflect the aesthetic charac-
ter of an area."' Few would argue against a coastal management pro-
gram whose goal is "maintain[ing] a society in which people will want to
own land."18
B. Proposals
In the event of unavoidable conflicts between public and private in-
terests, the United States would be wise to strike the balance on the side
of the environment in its coastal regulations. The coastal zone is a
unique, non-renewable resource; concerns for habitat and wetland pres-
ervation should outweigh current economic considerations.18 9 Most im-
portantly, however, the CZMA has consistently received support from
Congress, and state legislatures have also enthusiastically enacted their
own programs. The people, through their representatives, have indicated
their support for strong coastal zone management programs. It seems
reasonable to conclude that the people would be willing to share in an
increase in the cost of the programs. At the very least, the government
should attempt to ascertain how much, if any, increase in cost taxpayers
will subsidize.
If state agencies are hesitant to set aside land for coastal preserva-
tions because they fear they will be required to compensate landowners,
then agencies should consider other ways to accomplish their goals. Pro-
viding payment to landowners in the form of transfers of development
rights and compensated zoning may be part of the solution.1 9° Perhaps
187. See Bosselman & Callies, The Quiet Revolution in Land-Use Control, in A PLANNER'S
Gurna, supra note 1, at 303.
188. Id
189. See Huffman, supra note 1, at 252-53.
190. See R. ELLICKSON & A. D. TARLOCK, LAND UsE CONTROLS 701-03 (1981). Many
cities utilize transferable development rights (TDR's) as a method of compensating developers.
TDR's are authorizations that give developers increased freedom to develop certain parcels of
land in exchange for restrictions placed on other parcels. The feasibility and constitutionality
of TDR programs is questionable. Additionally, it is unclear whether TDR's would function
well in rural areas. Id
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United States coastal management agencies should also begin to expand
the role of private groups in their coastal zone management schemes,
Groups such as the Nature Conservancy, which is similar to the National
Trust in England, already exist in the United States and could be given
more recognition by the government. 91
If the Supreme Court's interpretations of the Constitution continue
to present a financial barrier to sound coastal zone management in the
United States, certain compensation schemes may provide a solution.
For example, one commentator has proposed, compensation schemes
which allow benefits created by regulations to be set off against losses,
thus reducing the amount of compensation necessary. 92 Conceivably,
the United States could also institute a plan under which landowners
receiving benefits from granted development permits are required to
compensate the state. The state, in turn, could use these funds to pay for
its environmental programs.1 93 Perhaps the state could simply charge
higher permit fees to offset costs.
In states like California, citizens have the opportunity to use the
ballot initiative process to institute environmentaly protective legisla-
tion, as they did with the original CCA. This process also could be used
to make supplemental funding available for coastal zone management
projects as, for example, when the ballot initiative process was used to
protect land in the Lake Tahoe area. 194 The sanie process has been used
to increase the funding available to the State Coastal Conservancy.'9"
Hopefully, authorities responsible for managing coastal areas in the
United States will join with concerned citizens and consider some of
these creative alternatives so that the country's unique coastal resources
will remain protected in the future.
191. See Mills, Conservation Easements in Oregon: Abuses and Solutions, 14 ENVTL, L. 555
(1984).
192. Bosselman & Callies, The Quiet Revolution in Land-Use Control, in A PLANNER'S
GUIDE, supra note 1, at 308.
193. See B. POOLEY, supra note 164, at 17. This theory comes from early English compen.
sation statutes. England has now abandoned the practice.
194. Lake Tahoe Acquisitions Bond Act, CAL. GOV. CODE §§ 66950-66966 (West 1986)
(originally added by Initiative Measure of November 2, 1982).
195. Wildlife, Coastal and Park Bond Act (added by Initiative Measure of June 7, 1988, to
be codified at CAL. PUB. REs. CODE §§ 5900-5938 (Deering 1989 Supp.).
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